









In this, paper, I am going to present an argument in favour of 
generalism and criticise the particularistic position in moral 
reasoning... According to generalism which is associated with 
supervenience, the way in which a morlly relevant feature 
contributes to the moral evaluation of different contexts is 
patternable. However, a particularist like Dancy utilizes the very 
idea of resultance  instead of supervenience to give an account of 
how a non-moral feature behaves in different contexts. An 
account drawn from Wittgenstein with regard to the nature of 
concepts is presented here to criticise the particulristic position 
while endorsing the very idea of supervenience and the 
generilistic position with regard to the extent of the patternability 
of the reason-giving behaviour of a morally relevant feature in 
different contexts      . 




What can we say with regard to the extent of the patternability of 
the reason-giving behaviour of a morally relevant feature in 
different ethical contexts? The main issue between generality 
and particularity in moral reasoning concerns the existence of 
patterns in use of moral vocabulary that would permit the 
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that vocabulary. Particularism challenges an intuitive notion of 
generalism. There are general patterns to which the reason-
giving behaviour of a morally relevant non-moral property in 
different contexts is responsive and this is the main issue in 
evaluating arguments of particularism and generalism. It 
concerns the way in which a morally relevant feature contributes 
to the moral evaluation of different cases. The subject can be 
formulated using the idea of supervenience, according to which 
if two concrete ethical situations are relevantly similar with 
respect to their non-moral (descriptive) properties, their moral 
(evaluative) properties would be the same. Suppose we are 
confronted with a concrete ethical situation, in which a moral 
property F supervenes on non-moral properties G and H. 
According to the generalist, should we come across a similar 
ethical situation in which G and H are combined together, the 
ultimate moral evaluation of the case would be the same —F 
would apply. So, subscribing to the existence of supervenience 
leads to approving the existence of general patterns to which the 
reason-giving behaviour of a morally relevant non-moral 
property can fit. In other words, with the aid of such patterns, we 
can see how a morally relevant non-moral property contributes 
to the moral evaluation of different cases . 
According to generalists who subscribe to the notion of 
supervenience, the reason-giving behaviour of a morally relevant 
feature in different cases is generalisable in the sense that its 
reason-giving behaviour is answerable to patterns of word use. 
But a particularist like Dancy prefers to talk about the idea of 
resultance with regard to the way in which non-moral properties 
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Resultance is a relation between a property of an object and the 
features that ‘give’ it that property. Not all properties are 
resultant; that is, not all properties depend on others in the 
appropriate way. But everyone agrees that moral properties are 
resultant. A resultant property is one which ‘depends’ on other 
properties in a certain way. As we might say, nothing is just 
wrong; a wrong action is wrong because of other features that it 
has…Supervenience, as a relation, is incapable of picking out the 
features that make the action wrong; it is too indiscriminate to be 
able to achieve such an interesting and important task (2004, 85-
88). 
According to this view, there is no such thing as a general 
pattern which summarises the reason-giving behaviour of a 
morally relevant feature and we cannot see how a morally 
relevant feature contributes to the moral evaluation of different 
cases by appealing to supervenience. Supervenience deals with 
the behaviour of a morally relevant feature in different ethical 
contexts, the way in which moral properties supervene upon the 
class of non-moral properties. In contrast, resultance concerns 
the way in which a moral property results from non-moral 
properties in a specific ethical situation. So, a particularist who 
claims there is no metaphysical account available of generality in 
moral reasoning, emphasises that the reason-giving behaviour of 
a morally relevant feature and its contribution to moral 
evaluation can vary from case to case as a result of combining 
with other features in many different ways. So, the reason-giving 
behaviour of a morally relevant feature is not generalisable to 
say, its relevance for reasoning in different cases is not 
answerable to general patterns of word use. Rather, the reason-
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relevant features are combined together in a specific moral 
situation. Therefore, according to Dancy, the idea of resultance, 
unlike supervenience, can better systematise our common 
sensical intuitions with regard to the way in which several 
morally relevant features are combined together in different 
ethical contexts  . 
Now I outline the particularist’s answer with regard to the extent 
of the patternability of the reason-giving behaviour of morally 
relevant features in different contexts which is associated with 
resultance while undermining superveneince  . 
 
1- The Particularists’ Answer 
According to the particularists’ standpoint, moral principles are 
strongly context-dependent in the sense that the reason-giving 
behaviour of a morally relevant feature is not answerable to 
general patterns . 
The main argument in support of particularism draws on the idea 
of holism about reasons for action. According to holism, morally 
relevant nonmoral properties are highly contextual, and may 
change their reason-giving behaviours from case to case where 
they are compounded with other morally relevant non-moral 
properties, so that what makes an action wrong in one case may 
make it right in another case. In other words, the deontic valence 
of a moral consideration (such as one's duty to fulfil his promise 
to someone else) is not constant, and may vary from case to case . 
Dancy’s argument in favour of holism about reasons for action is 
an application of holism about normative reasons in general. 
Dancy claims that normative reasons for belief are obviously and 
non-controversially holistic (highly contextual), and that it is 
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how could normative reasons for belief be holistic?  Dancy’s 
argument for this claim is as follows: suppose that something is 
in front of me, and I experience it as a red pencil. Experiencing 
something as a red pencil is a justified reason for me to believe 
that a red pencil is in front of me. Again suppose that, as a 
thought experiment, I have taken a pill which makes blue things 
seem red to me. In this case, experiencing something as a red 
pencil is a reason that justifies me in believing that a blue pencil 
is in front of me. Therefore, it is not the case that experiencing 
something as red always justifies me in believing that there is 
something red is in front of me. Conversely, it can justify me in 
believing that there is something blue is in front of me. Dancy 
says : 
It is not as if it is some reason for me to believe that there is 
something red before me, though that reason is overwhelmed by 
contrary reasons. It is no longer any reason at all to believe that 
there is something red before me; indeed, it is a reason for 
believing the opposite 2004, p.74. 
This means that reasons for belief behave holistically, and the 
way in which they are combined together and contribute to 
ultimate justification can vary from context to context. In other 
words, they have no intrinsic and invariant valence outside 
context, for their valence can change as a result of reacting to 
other reasons. 
 
2. Criticising the Particularistic Position: Wittgensteinian 
account of normativity 
In order to criticise Dancy’s constitutive and metaphysical claim 
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moral evaluation of different contexts, I draw on the account 
from Wittgenstein with regard to the nature of concepts . 
 Suppose we want to articulate and define the concept ‘game’. 
On the face of it, it seems that in order to do this we need to state 
common properties of games with which we have been 
confronted, such as: basketball, handball, snooker, chess, boxing, 
wrestling etc. On the basis of the common properties obtained, 
we would say that: 
If x meets the condition g1, g2, g3…gn, x is a ‘game ’.  
This view supposes that there is something in common which 
needs to be articulated and categorised to arrive at the definition 
of the concept ‘game’. It suggests that there is something in 
common among different kinds of games. By utilising the 
obtained general rule, we can say whether or not a new 
phenomenon can be regarded as a game. In this model, the 
general pattern acts as the normative standard of the rightness 
and wrongness of the use of words. 
However, Wittgenstein rejects the existence of such a common 
property in different kinds of games; something which can be 
articulated as an essence of the concept ‘game’. The whole idea 
of ‘family resemblance’ in Philosophical Investigations is 
concerned with the denial of such an approach to defining a 
concept like game. There is nothing in common among different 
games which can be articulated. For instance, if someone says 
that losing and winning can be regarded as a common feature of 
different games, we can show him other games in which there is 
no such thing as losing and winning like the child who builds a 
house using Lego. Moreover, if we want to consider equipment 
such as a ball, goal, net, racket etc. as a common feature or 
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boxing, wrestling etc. in which these items not used.  So, it 
seems that there is an open-ended list of game-making features 
which forms the different games with which we are familiar. So, 
it seems that we cannot arrive at what the concept ‘game’ is 
through articulating a feature common to different games. 
Nevertheless, we, as language-users use the word ‘game’ in our 
communication meaningfully. In other words, although there is 
an open-ended list of game-making features, we cannot regard 
anything we like as an example of the concept ‘game’. It seems 
that there is a normative constraint that requires us to see 
whether or not the phenomenon with which we are dealing can 
be regarded as a game. Wittgenstein attempts to show that the 
normative constraint that we are talking about cannot be put into 
words. Rather, it can only be grasped through ongoing practice 
of seeing the similarities and dissimilarities. There is nothing 
beyond seeing the similarities which can do this job. He states: 
What does it mean to know what a game is? What does it mean, 
to know it and not be able to say it?… Isn’t my knowledge, my 
concept of a game, completely expressed in the explanations that 
I could give? That is, in my describing examples of various kinds 
of games; showing how all sorts of other games can be 
constructed on the analogy of these (1953, §75   )  
 
According to Wittgenstein, it is not the case that I know what the 
concept ‘game’ is before being engaged in the practice of seeing 
the similarities. Rather, what we see within practice is all we 
have about the concept ‘game’. This results in the denial of the 
pre-existing concept of game. However, the more we are 
engaged in the practice of using the word, the more clearly we 
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meaning of a concept such as game, all we have is seeing the 
similarities: this is a game, that is a game, this is not a game etc. 
and this is not ignorance. Being engaged in practice is not a 
halfway and second hand explanation of what a game is. This is 
all we have at hand and it does not mean that any phenomenon 
can be regarded as an example of the concept ‘game’. Rather, 
there is a normative constraint which lies in the way in which we 
are engaged in seeing things as similar. In other words, it is not 
the case that regarding a new phenomenon as a game is a matter 
of taste and can be done arbitrarily or at random. Rather, there is 
a normative constraint which can be seen within practice. There 
is an account which can be given with regard to whether or not 
the new phenomenon is a game. The account becomes clearer to 
the extent that we are engaged in the practice of seeing things as 
similar. There is no such thing as a pre-existing and abstract 
pattern which can be utilised in order to see whether or not the 
new phenomenon is a game. Rather, there is an account with 
regard to the normative standard of the rightness and wrongness 
of the use of words which is associated with the way in which 
we are engaged in seeing the similarities. The crucial thing at 
this stage is that there is an account with regard to a normative 
constraint which can be given. In fact, in place of the notion of 
the pre-existing source of normativity, there is a normative 
constraint which can be seen merely within practice      . 
To the extent that we are engaged in the activity of seeing things 
as similar, we can see what the concept ‘game’ is. We have a 
role in shaping the concept. In other words, the concept ‘game’ 
emerges following our ongoing practice of seeing the 
similarities. Moreover, the concept ‘game’ is extendable. The 
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more the concept is extended. Practice has an indispensable role 
in the extendibility of the concept ‘game’. So, we can say that 
there is some generality in the concept ‘game’, albeit one that 
emerges . 
What follows from the Wittgensteinian story is that the reason-
giving behaviour of the word ‘game’ in different contexts is 
answerable to general patterns of word use. This is the 
constitutive and metaphysical claim with regard to the existence 
of patterns of word use . 
  Considering Wittgensteinian account of patternability and the 
way in which the reason-giving behaviour of a morally relevant 
feature is answerable and responsive to patterns of word use, it 
seems that Dancy’s claim about the very idea of supervenience is 
implausible. According to Dancy - as there is no such thing as an 
exactly similar ethical situation - to say that the reason-giving 
behaviour of a morally relevant feature would be answerable to 
general patterns in other ethical contexts is useless . 
But as we saw in the example of the concept ‘game’, although 
several game-making features are combined together in different 
ways, they are not responsive to general patterns of word use: 
Answerability to general patterns is not necessarily associated 
with the existence of exactly similar situations. As far as an 
emerging pattern is concerned, there is no such thing as a finite 
list of features which make the pattern. Nevertheless, there is 
such a thing as a normative constraint which can be seen to the 
extent that we are engaged in practice. So, we can subscribe to 
the idea of supervenience, according to which moral properties 
supervene upon non-moral properties in the sense that the 
reason-giving behaviour of a morally relevant feature in different 
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like ‘exactly similar situation’. In other words, the modest-
generalist can agree with a particularist like Dancy in criticising 
the idea of a pre-existing and fixed pattern according to which a 
new phenomenon has to be subsumed under a determined and 
rigid pattern. Such an account of pattern requires the new 
phenomenon to be exactly similar to the components of the 
pattern. But the modest-generalist can appeal to the idea of open-
endedness to give a constitutive account of patternability without 
appealing to pre-existing and determined pattern . 
 To summarise, Dancy’s claim with regard to the way in 
which the reason-giving behaviour of a non-moral feature 
contributes to the moral evaluation of different cases can be 
reconciled with the generalistic Wittgensteinian position which 
deploys the idea of patternability and answerability. It follows 
from this that still we can stick to the very idea of supervenience, 
as far as the reason-giving behaviour of a morally relevant 
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